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LAW AND SOCIAL WORK'
By RoscoE POUND*
A recent writer on philosophy of law tells us that the science
of law has to do with rule, idea of right, and life. It has to do
on the one hand with the imperative of the lawgiver, and on the
other hand, with the will of the individual. Thus it is between
the world of what-ought-to-be and of moral values, upon the
one hand, and the world of what is practicable and of what-is,
upon the other. He speaks of this as the tragedy of legal
thought. But if thinking about law is embarrassed between
what ought to be and what may be, the practical working of the
law is no less embarrassed between the claims of the general
security and those of the individual life.
In the statement of the purpose of this conference we are
told that it exists to "facilitate discussion of the problems and
methods of practical human improvement." A social philosopher would see in it, therefore, an institution working along with
legal institutions toward the maintenance, furtherance and
transmission of civilization, which he takes to be the end of law.
Social worker and lawyer should be co-workers upon different
portions of the task of enabling men to develop human control
over nature, both physical nature and human nature, to its highest possibilities. For the law is but a specialized part of the
whole regime of social control. Its aims are those of social control. Its ultimate justification is the justification of social control. Its agencies and sanctions are but specialized and systematized agencies and sanctions of social control. Indeed, the
historical jurist has always refused to differentiate law from
the wider idea of social control. When he speaks of law he
thinks of social control as a whole. It is the analytical jurist,
looking exclusively at the phenomena of the maturity of law,
who insists upon a distinction.
1 This was Dean Pound's address before the Indiana Conference on
Social Work, held at Elkhart, Oct. 8-14, 1927.
* See biographical note p. 223.
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In modern society social control through the force of politically organized society has become paramount. All other agencies
operate in subordination to the law. In its claims it has all but
taken over the whole field of upholding the conditions of the social and economic order, whereby we maintain, further, and
transmit civilization. But while potentially the whole field is
subject to law, many-other agencies, some determinate and acting consciously and of set purpose, and some indeterminate acting with less conscious and less definite purpose, perhaps achieve
the larger part of the task. The part that falls directly and immediately upon the law is maintenance of the general security.
How to maintain the general security in a human world which
is ever in transition is the immediate problem of the science of
law.
For things human are always in transition. The Heraclitean
dictum that everything flows is at least true of life. Life consists in adjustment to environment, and adjustment involves
change. Social life is adjustment to an environment which is
both physical and human. Each of us must fit into his physical
surroundings and his human surroundings. Hence law, which
is both a product and a condition of social life, must continually
adapt itself to change. Like the life which it orders, it is in continual transition. Yet it seeks to be stable in this process of
transition. It seeks, as it were, to give stability to institutions
and doctrines and precepts which are changing and must change.
Legal institutions must be stable because the economic order, in
which our civilization has culminated, presupposes the general
security. Yet those institutions govern life, and the essence of
life is change. Thus law and legal institutions must be stable,
and yet they cannot stand still. They must reconcile the freedom which is life and the restraint which is civilized life. They
must reconcile the general security and the individual life. They
must keep a due balance between the need of stability and the
need of change.
In practice, the balance has inclined sometimes toward one
side and sometimes toward the other. In the last century it
inclined definitely to the side of stability. The last half of the
nineteenth century was relatively a period of social and political
and economic stability. A homogeneous society thought chiefly
of the security of acquisitions. A settled political order thought
chiefly of the stability of institutions. A pioneer society
thought chiefly in terms of freedom; but in the conditions of
life in a rural, agricultural society, that meant the minimum
of interference with free spontaneous self-assertion which was
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required to keep the peace and maintain private property. Today, on the other hand, the balance seems to be inclining to the
side of change. The heterogeneous society of our urban industrial centers thinks more about the claims of the individual life.
A political order in process of adjustment to urban life leads to
scrutiny of the purpose of each institution and consideration of
how far institutions achieve those purposes in action. The conditions of life in an urban industrial society call for great increase in the number of legal adjustments, since they involve
multiplied points of contact of man with man and a continually
widening area of overlapping or conflicting claims. Transition
is a much more significant factor in the law of today than it was
half a century ago.
In this transition perhaps the most significant feature, from
the jurist's standpoint, is the continually growing emphasis upon
Jhering, who first saw the
the claims of the individual life.
change which has gone so far since his death, put it thus: "Formerly high valuing of property, lower valuing of the person;
now lower valuing of property, higher valuing of the person."
How far this has gone in a generation of legal development in
this county, may be seen if we note the rise of limitations on the
use of property and restraints upon the anti-social exercise of
legal rights; if we consider what has happened to the owner's
jus abutendi, if we compare the doctrines as to spite fences or
malicious interference with a neighbor's well or unreasonable
interception of surface water or of percolating water which now
obtain with those which were accepted a generation ago. It
may be seen if we note the changed attitude of the courts toward
housing laws and zoning laws; the growth of limitations on freedom of contract, the growth of limitations on the owner's power
of disposition of property where the owner is husband or parent and the property is needed or used for the purposes of a
family; the growth of limitations on the power of the creditor
or injured party to exact satisfaction, as, for instance, by statutes for the payment of judgments in installments; the change
from a regime of private ownership of wild game and private
rights as to running water which has been making such things
-res publicae in so many jurisdictions; and most significant of all
the change of attitude as to the legal position of married women
and the claims of parents with respect to children. On every
side, the claims of the individual life have been calling for modification of old doctrines and working out of new ones. Also
they have called for new methods of applying legal precepts in
action.
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Increased regard for the individual life has brought about
two movements which have been going on throughout the world.
First, there is a movement for individualization of justice, and a
response to this movement may be seen in the rise of administrative justice. A significant and apparently permanent phenomenon in Anglo-American law is the development in the last two
decades of administrative adjustment of relations and forestalling or summary handling of controversies by boards and commissions. In antiquity the chief activities of politically organized society were war and religion. In the modern state the chief
activities are legislation and administration. Both of these
seem to be growing at the expense of the traditional or customary element in public justice. Instead of leaving all, or nearly
all, controversies to be determined after the event by tribunals
applying customary standards of decision, ascertained and
worked out and made into grounds of decision by means of a
customary technique, the modern state more and more forestalls
controversy by prescribing rules through legislation, or deals
with the conditions that produce controversy by subjecting conduct, and especially the conduct of enterpriseg, to the guidance
of administrative regulation.
Everyday experience may remind us how far the change from
judicial inquiry and judicial application of customary standards
after the event has gone in the modern city. A generation ago
there were no traffic rules for ordinary vehicles, and no traffic
policemen. Beyond a custom of turning to the right, everything
was left to the judgment and good sense of pedestrian and driver.
If one went out upon the street on coming to a crossing he exercised his own judgment as to when and where and how he should
cross. When a driver came to a crossing he also exercised his
free judgment. Each made up his own mind for himself at the
crisis of action. If injury resulted, the judgment he had formed
for himself was looked into after the event by a jury which then
told him whether or not he had lived up to the customary standard. But today lines down the middle of roads tell where to
drive, lines upon the pavement tell where to cross the street, and
other lines tell where to park cars. Signals and signalling traffic
officers tell when to cross the street and when to stop and await
one's turn. This change is typical of what has been happening
on every side. We now seek to handle concrete situations concretely at the time they arise, and in the place where they arise
instead of referring to abstract generalizations and treating
them out of their setting of time and place. We seek to prevent
rather than to cure after the event. We give individualized
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treatment to the case in hand instead of generalized treatment
to an abstract situation.
Indeed no one should be more familiar with this change than
the social worker. He has seen parallel changes in his own experience growing out of the same conditions which are bringing
about changes in the law. He remembers how a generation ago
we treated not lunatics but "the lunatic." We did not give the
needed help, medical or otherwise, to this or that human being
afflicted with mental disease, we made general provision for insanity in the abstract. He remembers how fifty years ago, instead of providing for specific children according to the exigencies of the character and antecedents and condition of each,
we made provision for "the child." He remembers how a generation ago we did not relieve this or that case of poverty as
such in view of its special cause and circumstance, but instead
dealt with the abstract "pauper" and consigned to a common
poorhouse the vagrant, the worn-out toiler, the drunken unemployable, the victim of disease, the imbecile and the abandoned
child. He remembers that a generation ago instead of seeking
to give individualized penal treatment to criminals we punished
"the criminal." The same contrast which may be drawn between
the judicial justice of the nineteenth century and the administrative justice of today is no less valid as between the charities
and corrections of fifty years ago and the social work of today.
Next to and along with the movement for individualization of
justice comes demand for and movement toward preventive justice. The law is given effect by means of sanctions. These sanctions or means by which developed legal systems seek to attain
their end are punishmqnt, redress and prevention. Punishment
is the oldest and crudest mode of securing human claims or vindicating rights. Even today, as a general rule, men begin to deal
with a new subject by imposing a penalty. It is only after experience of the ineffectiveness of retributive methods that they
learn some better mode of treatment. In modern law punishment is appropriated almost exclusively to the immediate securing of social interests as such by means of the criminal law.
Also on the whole we have learned that the effective domain of
the criminal law is relatively narrow. On the civil side of the
law there are a few remnants of an older condition in which
punishment was resorted to for the everyday vindication of private rights. But even in criminal law we have now come to
think and speak of penal treatment rather than of punishment.
We recognize that except for satisfying a certain instinct of
men to hurt someone when things go wrong, punishment simply
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as such has proved futile on the criminal side of the law as we
had long known it to be on the civil side.
Legal redress is either specific or substitutional. In specific
redress the wrongdoer is compelled to do specifically what he
has wr.,ngfully left undone, or to undo what he did wrongfully.
He is required to restore that which he holds which belongs to
another, and if necessary officers of the law will take it from
him and deliver it to the person entitled. In substitutional redress the law awards an injured person a substituted equivalent
in the form of a sum of money at the expense of the wrongdoer.
Specific redress is possible in the case of possessory rights,
and acts involving purely economic advantages. A court can
repossess a plaintiff of a farm but it cannot repossess him of
his reputation. It can make a defendant restore a chattel but it
cannot compel him to restore the alienated affections of a wife.
It can constrain a defendant to perform a contract to sell land,
but it cannot constrain him to restore the peace of mind of one
whose sensibilities have been grossly invaded. For most cases
in everyday life substitutional redress by way of money damages is the most practicable resource. Hence this has been the
staple remedy of the law. But this remedy is obviously inadequate except where the purely economic side of existence is involved. The law may measure in money the value of a horse
or the value of a commercial contract or the value of use and occupation of land. On the other hand, it is difficult to reach a
definite measure of actual money compensation for a broken
limb, and it is downright impossible to value the feelings, the
honor, or the dignity of an injured human being. Kipling tells
us what the Oriental thinks of our legal conception of the individual honor, dignity, character and reputation. He says: "Is
a man sad? Give him money, say the Sahibs. Is he dishonored?
Give him money, say the Sahibs. Hath he a wrong upon his
head? Give him money, say the Sahibs." That the Oriental's
point is well taken is clear enough. But serious practical difficulties stand in the way of specific redress in such cases. Complaint is often made that the law secures property and contract
more elaborately and more adequately than it secures personality. The reason is not that the law rates the latter less highly
than the former. It is that the legal machinery of redress is
intrinsically well adapted to securing the one and is ill adapted
to securing the other.
Prevention is not so definite nor so well developed a remedial
category. In general it must take the form of interference in
advance to prevent disobedience of a rule of law or provision in
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advance to meet and obviate the conditions which make for antisocial conduct. As an ideal it should mean provision for reaching the causes of anti-social conduct instead of treating the resulting conduct by itself. It should mean provision for mitigating or obviating the situations that lead to infringement of
rights instead of relying wholly upon punishment and redress
after the event. Development of prevention as a legal remedy
has only begun. What we have in the way of prevention is for
the most part relatively crude interference by injunction to prevent immediately threatened physical infringements of economic
claims, and in recent years to prevent interference with nationwide economic functions which are under the protection of the
federal government. In England injunctions are used to prevent defamation and there is an increasing tendency in this country to use them in order to protect personality. But the deeper
possibilities of prevention have received little attention from
lawyers. While it seems clear that preventive justice must play
a large part in the law of the future, there is much prejudice
against it in the minds of commonlaw lawyers.
Administration has thus far proved the most effective agency
of administrative justice. Thus we may understand the growth
of administrative justice which has gone forward so rapidly in
the last twenty-five years. Administration had little place in
the pioneer, rural, agricultural society of the last century. It
belongs to a busy age. It is appropriate to a crowded urban
industrial society with a complex economic organization and
minute division of labor. In such a society economic adjustments
are so delicate and all things are so specialized that men cannot
wait for long drawn out investigation after the event in order
to know their rights and duties and liabilities. What they may
do and what they may not do must be prescribed authoritatively
in advance in an accessible and intelligible form. They must
be guided or advised or directed in many things so that they may
do well the other things which are their immediate task. The
illustration of traffic officers in our city streets, and even in our
country roads, puts graphically what is required in the way of
administrative regulation in all sorts of connections under the
conditions of today. For administration does for an increasing
number of activities exactly what the traffic officer at the corner
does both for automobile driver and for pedestrian. The efficacy
of the work of the traffic officer is in the individualized nature of
his directions as compared with generalized legal precepts. The
economic organization of today demands an individualization in
the handling of many things which was not needed in the sim-
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pler rural agricultural society of the past. When the points of
contact between men are relatively few, general lines and rough
compromises expressed in rules of law suffice for the exigencies
of justice. When the points of contact are multiplied as in the
metropolitan city of today, and individual claims conflict and
overlap on all sides, we must have fine lines and delicate discriminations which are not made easily by means of rules of law.
Rules of law are made by eliminating the particular circumstances and fixing the common circumstances in a series of cases.
In some parts of the law this is entirely practicable. In the law
of property and in commercial law where one fee simple is like
every other and one promissory note is like every other so far.
as its significant elements go, this method of elimination and
generalization suffices to give a working rule. But elimination
of circumstances in order to get a rule makes the rule unworkable as a self-sufficient practical compromise between the claims
of participants in the infinitely variable situations involved in
human conduct and in the conduct of enterprises. When the
points of contact involved in human conduct become more numerous, and the friction of that contact becomes more acute, in
a crowded Vorld, individualization in the legal treatment of
conduct begins to encroach upon the domain of legal rules and
legal conceptions. We meet this need of individualization for
the purposes of judicial justice by means of legal standards,
that is, by framing legally defined measures of conduct which
are to be applied by or under the direction of tribunals.
In the framing of legal standards the law does not seek to
generalize by eliminating the circumstances, nor to particularize
by including them. It seeks to formulate the general expectation of society as to how individuals will act in the course of
their undertakings. Thus it seeks to guide the common sense
of a jury or the expert intuition of an administrative commission when either has to judge of particular conduct under particular circumstances. We may agree that titles to land and the
negotiability of bills of exchange and promissory notes ought
not to depend on circumstances. Such matters should be and
are governed by rules which attach definite detailed legal consequences to definite detailed states of fact. Such rules are not
left to juries or commissions. When the facts are ascertained
the rules are applied by a mechanical logical process. On the
other hand, it is impossible to determine in the abstract once
for all what is due care in driving for every driver who will ever
drive. It is impossible to lay down in the abstract once for all
for an abstract railroad running through an abstract region
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what is a reasonable railway service, and to apply the result to
all railroads thereafter by a logical process. In such cases modern law resorts to legal standards devised to guide the triers
of fact or the administrative commission in applying to each
unique set of circumstances their common sense resulting from
their experience.
Legal standards are the judicial response to the need of individualization just as the setting up of administrative tribunals
and increasing reliance upon administration is the legislative
response thereto. Each is ultimately a response to the conditions
of a crowded, urban, industrial society, and of a complicated
economic order resting on a minute division of labor. The same
conditions that brought each into existence are making and must
make for a greater development of preventive justice.
For historical reasons we have very little in the way of preventive machinery in our common law. In the Roman law judicial power was in the magistrates, and an administrative civil
justice has obtained in Roman-law countries from the beginning. With us administration of justice had a purely judicial
development and administration is something which we are having to learn. Our courts of equity developed their methods and
theories of jurisdiction partly under civil law influence and at
a time when the centralized absolute government of Tudor and
Stuart kings was importing many administrative ideas from the
Continent. Thus we have a certain preventive jurisdiction in
equity. Courts of equity will enjoin threatened injuries to property rights and will construe trusts and will advise trustees as
to their duties. But until recently when the declaratory judgment began to be introduced cautiously by legislation we required that one break a contract before a court would tell him
what it meant. We required the parties to instruments to guess
at their meaning and act upon their guesses at their peril. In
most jurisdictions one must commit a trespass in order to find
out whether he has a right of way, or commit an assault if he
would test his neighbor's claim to such a right. Unless a friendly
district attorney will consent to participate in a suit in the nature of a bill of peace, if one wishes to test the constitutionality
of legislation curtailing the free exercise of his powers he must
run the risk of going to jail in order to find out what are his
rights. The beneficiary of a will can do nothing to establish
the facts which show its validity so long as the testator is alive.
And a testator can do nothing to establish those facts; but the
matter must await his death, it may be fifty years hence, when
the question of his capacity at the time it was made will become
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a controversy between claimants under it and claimants against
it. It is such things that give point to Mr. Dooley's gibe that it
is the function of the probate court to see to it that every member of the bar gets a fair chance at what the deceased cannot
take with him.
Bar association committees in this country have been urging
legislation to provide preventive remedies in civil cases through
declaratory judgments. Likewise the gradual but persistent and
continual enlargement of the powers of courts of equity to grant
injunctions, and the continually growing use of injunctions as a
means of police, especially in industrial disputes, show that a
movement for preventive justice is gaining ground. Moreover,
with the setting up of modern municipal courts in our large
cities we have begun to devise bureaus of justice to which the
citizen may resort in order to know his rights instead of leaving
him to guess at them at his peril and then judging his conduct
after the event. But this cautious development of preventive
justice on the civil side of the law is but a small part of the matter. It leaves untouched the great field of the criminal law; a
field in which more than anywhere else preventive justice may
achieve great things.
Substantially all of the energies of our elaborate punitive justice are devoted to dealing with offenders after the offense. The
police are an agency of prevention. But for the most part the
police operate as an agency of forcible prevention at the crisis of
action. Juvenile courts have done much incidentally in the way
of preventive activity directed to the ultimate causes of delinquency. Our agencies of probation and parole struggling with
many adverse conditions and in most jurisdictions laboring under a burden of defective organization and insufficient equipment
have done much in the same direction. Yet making full allowance for these things, it remains true that our legal treatment of
delinquents is not preventive but is punitive in its whole conception and administration. In effect what there is in the way
of preventive justice in the domain of the criminal law is
achieved not by legal but by extra legal agencies. For the most
part it is done not by the agencies of the law but by social
workers.
What we need above all else in this connection is co-operation.
As things are there is almost a complete want of co-operation
in our agencies of criminal justice. There is lack of co-operation between state and nation. There is lack of co-operation between state and state. There is lack of co-operation between
locality and locality in the state. There is lack of co-operation
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between the official agencies of justice in the community. There
is lack of co-operation between the extra legal and legal agencies
everywhere. Most of what has been done to remedy this condition-a condition natural in a pioneer, rural, agricultural community, and utterly out of place in the urban, industrial society
of today-has been done by or at the instance of social workers.
Those who urge co-operation on the large scale which is demanded by present day conditions find a serious obstacle in the general fear of centralization. But co-operation does not mean
centralization. On the contrary it is the alternative of centralization. Take such situations as that presented in the wellknown Dodge extradition. Dodge, who was wanted in New York
for perjury, had fled to Texas. In the endeavor to get him from
Texas to New York, four extradition warrants became necessary.
There were four habeas corpus proceedings; there was an injunction suit, an appeal, a clash between federal and state jurisdiction, and ultimately it required the extra-legal activities of
a masterful detective to put Dodge on a boat and send him to
New York without waiting for legal authority. Such things as
this will compel centralization unless we learn co-operation. The
same sort of story may be told for almost every step in the enforcement of the criminal law against those who are in a position to invoke the possibilities of our atomistic organization of
criminal justice.
In particular we need the fullest team play between law and
social work. In the urban, industrial society of today our organized social control must more and more deal with the antisocial in its inception and at its source. Characteristically we
have left the exploration and development of the field to private
agencies. Social workers have accumulated a mass of data and
have developed methods and technique which the lawyer must
study and must learn how to utilize. In order to bring about
the needed team play, in order to make use of all that has been
done and is doing for preventive justice through the agencies
of social work, we need the same creative spirit and inventive
activity which Americans and American lawyers displayed so
abundantly in the formative period of our institutions.
What are lawyers doing toward this needed development of
preventive justice? What are organized lawyers-for there are
notable exceptions among individual lawyers-what are organized lawyers doing to promote this needed team play? We must
admit that neither jurists nor law schools nor bar associations
have done or are doing much to speak of. In Continental Europe such things fall within the purview of ministries of jus-
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tice, and such ministries have been urged for English-speaking
jurisdictions. A century ago Bentham argued for a ministry
of justice in England. Later it was advocated by Lord Westbury, and in 1918, in an admirable report on reorganization of
British government, Lord Haldane stated the case for such an
institution most convincingly. Lately i~t has been advocated in
Nqw York by a commission of which Judge Cardozo was a
member, and that great authority has urged it in an article in
one of our legal periodicals. But it seems unlikely that we shall
have ministries of justice in English-speaking jurisdictions in
any near future. Lord Birkenhead, in opposing the project,
urges that their work would be vitiated by politics, and that they
would give us the same deficient and one-sided preparation for
law-making which we get as things are. At any rate, it is evident that the public would assume this; and without the confidence of the public, such ministries could achieve little.
And yet something of the sort we must have. Hence I have
been suggesting as a substitute organized systematic research
in our universities where alone conditions of effective work and
guarantees of public confidence seem assured. The alternative
is research under the auspices of privately endowed foundations.
In either case, undoubtedly, we have assurance of security of
tenure, adequate facilities, competent investigators, opportunity
of dealing with problems as wholes, rather than in detached
local fragments, and scientific spirit and method. But the work
of the foundation seems less likely to inspire the needed public
confidenice. We have seen in many connections how unhappily
suspicion of these foundations may operate whenever they venture into controversial fields. On the whole, I suspect, we shall
have to fall back upon our universities, with their ample faculties of law and of arts or of philosophy, from which, if systematically organized, effective institutes of research in preparation for legislation could be set up, in which the national
and the local would be represented in due balance. For in this
connection we must not overlook the fear of centralization which
has become so general and so strong. The locally known and
locally respected university could give to its work the national
aspect which our social and economic unification require, and
yet be free from suspicion of seeking to efface the organized locality. Moreover, we cannot overestimate the value of a group
of specialists in many lines working together, such as the faculties of a university make possible.
In the law school there is already the foundation of a ministry
of justice. Here should be the men trained, filled with the scien-
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tifie spirit, independent of particular interests, seeing questions
as a whole, in their setting not merely of the law of their state,
but of the life and law of the nation and of the world. For a
law school has not done its whole duty when it has sent forth
well trained lawyers to take up the practice of their profession.
The lawyer of tomorrow has more to do than merely to earn a
livelihood by faithfully representing his clients. He has a creative task before him to be carried out in bar associations, in
the legislature and as a citizen, in making our law no less effective as an instrument of justice in the century that is upon
us than it was in the century that is past. Nor is the task of
the law school done when it has bred lawyers equal to that work.
It must learn to do the work of research. It should learn to
organize and carry forward the research which must go before
creative lawmaking. I look forward to a group of law schools
in this country in which legal scholars shall be the means of
bringing together the technique and the experience of lawyers
and of social workers and of making each fruitful for the advancement of justice-for the furthering of reason and the will
of God.

